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ABSTRACT 
 
It is only relatively recently that attention has been paid to what happens post-decision or 
judgment and whether many of these documents and standards elaborated by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and decisions and judgments adopted by the 
African Commission and African Court actually result in any meaningful change on the 
ground. This article focuses on the monitoring of implementation of decisions and judgments 
of the African Commission and African Court. Although findings are still at a preliminary 
stage, our research asserts the following broad conclusions: firstly, it reveals that the body 
monitoring implementation is expected to play various roles. Secondly, while there indeed 
has been some movement to establish processes and mechanisms at the regional level to 
monitor implementation of the decisions and judgments, and considerable thought appears 
to have gone into developing these, the specific role that these respective bodies can 
themselves play in monitoring implementation is confused and does not necessarily play to 
their respective strengths. Thirdly, perhaps because of this confused state of play, there is 
an impasse, certainly at the level of the African Commission, in developing further the 
monitoring of implementation. While larger processes of reform such as amendments to the 
African Commission’s Rules of Procedure and the AU reform agenda offer opportunities to 
address these issues in a more coherent and holistic way, it is recognised that resulting 
changes in practice are likely to take considerable time to emerge. This is not least because 
of the significant logistic difficulties the secretariat of the African Commission has continually 
faced and the ongoing resource constraints of both it and the African Court. This article 
therefore concludes by proposing some pragmatic, low-cost solutions to move monitoring 
implementation forward on the continent. 
 
A. Introduction 
 
When the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Charter’) was adopted 30 
years ago debate, in particular, scholarly debate on the new African human rights system 
focused on its provisions and whether, what on paper appeared to be a toothless, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Commission’) would have any effect 
on promoting and protecting the broad range of rights contained in the African Charter. Over 
the years, the African Commission developed standards on the various provisions of the 
African Charter through the adoption of resolutions or general comments, and through the 
various activities of its special procedures. It has received over 400 communications, nearly 
all from individuals, organisations or groups alleging violations of the rights in the ACHPR. In 
2006 it was joined by the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Court’) 
which has have since received cases and adopted, albeit a few, judgments.  
 
It is only relatively recently, however, perhaps in line with shifts at the international level and 
among human rights funders that attention has been paid to what happens post-decision or 
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judgment,1 and whether many of these documents and standards elaborated by the African 
Commission and decisions and judgments adopted by the African Commission and African 
Court actually result in any meaningful change on the ground. This article draws upon 
preliminary findings from a collaborative research project examining the implementation of 
cases from the African Court and Commission, as well as the regional treaty bodies in 
Europe and the Americas and some of the treaty bodies in the UN.2   
 
This article focuses on the monitoring of implementation of decisions and judgments of the 
African Commission and African Court, and not on other findings such as concluding 
observations or resolutions. We use the term ‘implementation’ to refer to the process by 
which individual or collective measures are taken (through legislation, judicial decision, 
administrative action, executive decree, or other steps) to give effect to an adverse 
judgment/decision.3 This is distinguished from ‘compliance’, which is a status which is 
attained if and when a State’s law and practice are in line with the requirements of the 
judgment or decision, as interpreted by the responsible international body.4 Thus, 
compliance is understood as the outcome of implementation: a state implements a 
judgment/decision in order to ensure that it is in compliance with its obligations under this 
ruling. The African system bodies use the terms ‘monitor’ or ‘follow-up’ to  decisions and 
judgments which we consider broader terms to cover the formal and informal processes of 
oversight of the human rights bodies and it is these which this article examines. Whilst 
acknowledging that the monitoring of implementation cannot be the sole responsibility of the 
respective treaty bodies, this article concentrates specifically on their role. The contribution 
of the other AU organs, including the Assembly of the Union, Executive Council, Peace and 
Security Council (PSC), Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), the AU Commission 
as well as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), will be touched upon but as they form the basis 
of another article in this collection will not be dealt with fully here.  
 
 
B. What role should these bodies play? 
It is first worth reiterating that it is clear from our research that the African Commission and 
African Court should themselves play some role in monitoring implementation of their own 
decisions and judgments. Firstly, it gives them a sense of ownership, as interviewees told 
us: the African Court ‘still need(s) to know if the decision  has been implemented or not in 
case [it needs] to issue other orders, or draw parties to other cases’; further: ‘it is good to see 
that your decisions are implemented and monitored’. In addition, the bodies are then able to 
assess their own impact and consequently amend their practices accordingly. The ability to 
indicate examples of where States have implemented also contributes to enhancing the 
legitimacy and credibility of the body itself. This will then ‘build confidence in the institution’:  
                                                          
1 See Open Society Justice Initiative From judgment to justice: Implementing international and 
regional human rights decisions (2010) 12; Open Society Justice Initiative From rights to remedies: 
Structures and strategies for implementing international human rights decisions (2013) 26; C Heyns & 
F Viljoen The impact of the United Nations human rights treaties on the domestic level (2002) 1. 
2 For information on the project see: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/law/research/centres-
themes/hric/projects/implementationandcompliance/#d.en.278672. This is an independent research 
project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) of the UK. 
3 See M Burgstaller Theories of compliance with international law (2004) 4; R Murray & D Long The 
implementation of the findings of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2015) 28; 
VO Ayeni ‘Introduction’ in VO Ayeni (ed) The impact of the African Charter and the Maputo Protocol in 
selected African states (2016) 9. 
4 K Raustiala ‘Compliance and effectiveness in international regulatory cooperation’ (2000) 32 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 388-391; B Kingsbury ‘The concept of compliance as a 
function of competing conceptions of international law’ (1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 345. 
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‘the Court should work towards the ideal position, where compliance with its 
decisions impacts on the Respondent State’s legitimacy among its peers, in other 
words, non-compliance with the Court’s decisions will have adverse consequences to 
States which they cannot afford to ignore. The Court should continue undertaking its 
work with independence and integrity without fear of repercussions from Member 
States. It should avoid self-censoring, which could arise from a fear of non-
compliance with its decisions or a fear of active backlash against it’.5 
 
From our research we would suggest grouping monitoring implementation into two 
categories: that which can be viewed as reactive (for example, receiving information on the 
extent to which the State has implemented any recommendations or orders) and proactive 
(e.g. going out and seeking information where it is lacking; cross-checking that evidence and 
validating what has been said; and then also making assessments on whether this is 
sufficient or not based on some clear criteria of what is satisfactory implementation). 
 
Our research has found that the African Commission and African Court play, or are 
considered to play, a variety of different roles when it comes to ‘monitoring’ implementation. 
These include: information gathering; reporting; dialogue with the parties; interpretation and 
technical assistance; assessment; coordination; and enforcement. Our terminology 
recognises, but does not necessarily equate with, proposals made by the African Court itself 
in consideration of Articles 29 and 30 of the Protocol (see below). 
 
‘Information-gathering’ we consider to mean receiving and/or seeking evidence from the 
parties to the case as well as other actors on what measures States have undertaken to 
implement the decision or judgment. This may take the form of direct questions to the State 
delegation during consideration of State reports, holding implementation hearings, 
correspondence to parties and visits to relevant stakeholders at the domestic level.  
 
‘Reporting’ encompasses informing others, including organs of the AU and other national 
and international actors, of the measures taken by the State. ‘Dialogue’ entails that the 
monitoring body will work with the two parties to the communication either through offering 
‘good offices’ or facilitating meetings to discuss the implementation of the measures. 
 
‘Interpretation and technical assistance’ is where the monitoring body will provide further 
clarification on what the specifics of its recommendations and orders mean. ‘Assessment’ is 
the evaluation of the extent to which the State has implemented the recommendations or 
orders. In addition, the bodies can also play a role in coordinating efforts to monitor 
implementation with other bodies at the national or regional level. The ‘naming and shaming’ 
through the publication of lists of States that have failed to implement; Rules 118(1) and (2) 
of the African Commission’s Rules of Procedure which enable it to refer cases to the African 
Court when the State has failed to comply;6 or ultimately the ability of the AU organs to 
impose sanctions on States7 we consider to offer some tools of ‘enforcement’. Here 
                                                          
5 Communique/Outcome of the International Symposium on the 10th Anniversary of the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. A Decade of Human Rights Protection in Africa, 21-22 November 
2016, Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, p.5. 
6 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Great Socialist Peoples’ Arab Jamahiriya, 
Application 002/2013, with respect to Rule 118(2). 39th Activity Report of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, May - November 2015, para 27. 
7 Article 23(2) of the Constitutive Act. See African Court Coalition, Booklet on the Implementation of 
Decisions of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (2017) para 2.3.1. See also Rule 33(2) 
Assembly Rules of Procedure. However, see Rule 36 Rules of the Assembly, and counter-argument 
by GM Wachira and A Ayinla, ‘Twenty years of elusive enforcement of the recommendations of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Possible Remedy’, (2006) 6 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 465-492, at 484. 
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consequences may flow from the failure to implement. These various forms of monitoring are 
not always distinct, neither are they mutually exclusive. 
 
A related issue is that whatever role these bodies play must not impact on their neutrality 
and independence. This applies equally to the African Commission as to the African Court. 
The legitimacy and credibility of the bodies comes in part from the perception of them as 
independent and their ability to be resolute in the face of pressures from States or other 
actors. Some of the tasks employed in monitoring implementation potentially could 
compromise this neutrality. So, for example, on the one hand one might see the benefits for 
a Commissioner who lived in the State against which decision was adopted to be a source of 
expertise for the State authorities when determining how to implement that decision. On the 
other, his or her lack of engagement with the case prior to its adoption, in accordance with 
the Rules of Procedure to ensure their neutrality, does not make this a straightforward 
proposition. 
 
Bearing in mind the importance of independence, the question then becomes: what roles do 
the treaty provisions and rules of procedure presume? 
 
C. Treaty Provisions and Rules of Procedure/Rules of Court 
Article 1 of the ACHPR requires States Parties to ‘recognise the rights, duties and freedoms 
enshrined in the Charter’ and to ‘undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give 
effect to them’. The African Commission has a broad mandate in Article 45 to promote, 
protect and interpret the ACHPR and Article 46 further enables it to ‘resort to any appropriate 
method of investigation’; it may hear from the Chairperson of the AU Commission or any 
other person capable of enlightening it. Rule 98(4) of the African Commission’s Rules of 
Procedure requires the State to report to the African Commission on measures taken to 
implement provisional measures. Rule 112 has further detail on ‘follow-up’ on the 
recommendations of the Commission. This provides: 
 
1. After the consideration of the Commission’s Activity Report by the Assembly, the 
Secretary shall notify the parties within thirty (30) days that they may disseminate the 
decision.  
2. In the event of a decision against a State Party, the parties shall inform the Commission 
in writing, within one hundred and eighty (180) days of being informed of the decision in 
accordance with paragraph one, of all measures, if any, taken or being taken by the State 
Party to implement the decision of the Commission. 
3. Within ninety (90) days of receipt of the State’s written response, the Commission may 
invite the State concerned to submit further information on the measures it has taken in 
response to its decision. If no response is received from the State, the Commission may 
send a reminder to the State Party concerned to submit its information within ninety (90) 
days from the date of the reminder. 
5. The Rapporteur for the Communication, or any other member of the Commission 
designated for this purpose, shall monitor the measures taken by the State Party to give 
effect to the Commission’s recommendations on each Communication. 
6. The Rapporteur may make such contacts and take such action as may be appropriate 
to fulfill his/her assignment including recommendations for further action by the 
Commission as may be necessary. 
7. At each Ordinary Session, the Rapporteur shall present the report during the Public 
Session on the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations. 
8. The Commission shall draw the attention of the Sub-Committee of the Permanent 
Representatives Committee and the Executive Council on the Implementation of the 
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Decisions of the African Union, to any situations of non-compliance with the Commission’s 
decisions.  
9. The Commission shall include information on any follow-up activities in its Activity 
Report. 
 
In setting out when the African Commission is able to submit a case to the African Court, 
Rule 118(1) and (2) provides that this can be done where the African Commission ‘considers 
that the State has not complied or is unwilling to comply with its recommendations in respect 
of the communication within the period stated in Rule 112(2)’ and where it ‘considers that the 
State has not complied with the Provisional Measures requested’. Rule 125 enables the 
African Commission to request the AU Assembly, when it submits its activity report, ‘to take 
necessary measures to implement its decisions’ and for the African Commission to ‘bring all 
its recommendations to the attention of the Sub-Committee on the Implementation of the 
Decisions of the African Union of the Permanent Representatives Committee’. 
 
Article 29(2) of the Protocol on the African Court states that the now Executive Council of the 
AU ‘shall also be notified of the judgment and shall monitor its execution on behalf of the 
Assembly’. Under Article 30 States Parties are required to ‘comply with the judgment in any 
case to which they are parties within the time stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its 
execution’ and in compliance with Article 31 the Court shall submit a report to each regular 
session of the Assembly which should include ‘the cases in which a State has not complied 
with the Court's judgment’. 
 
Rule 51 of the Rules of Court notes that the Article 31 report shall also include reference to 
the interim measures ordered by the Court and [i]n the event of non-compliance with these 
measures by the State concerned, the Court shall make all such recommendations as it 
deems appropriate’ and it can also ‘invite the parties to provide it with information on any 
issue relating to implementation of the interim measures adopted by it’. Rule 54(5) of Rules 
of Court enables the Court to ‘invite the parties to provide it with information on any issue 
relating to implementation of the interim measures adopted by it’. 
 
D. Mechanisms 
The challenge with monitoring implementation of the judgments of the African Court and 
decisions of the African Commission does not appear to be due to the lack of available 
mechanisms to do so. In addition to any specific procedure or mechanism to deal with 
monitoring, these bodies have also used their existing procedures to monitor implementation 
of their judgments and decisions.  So the African Commission has asked questions of States 
during the examination of their Article 62 reports about what measures have been taken to 
implement decisions; it has amended the structure of its activity reports to refer to the 
implementation status of decisions;8 it has included follow-up on decisions in its fact-finding 
missions by special procedures9 and its promotional missions;10 and made reference to the 
status of implementation of decisions in country-specific resolutions.11  
                                                          
8 E.g. 35th Activity Report of the African Commission, reference to Communication 323/06, Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v Egypt, to ‘follow-up on implementation’, p.27, see 
also para 27: ‘With regards to Communication 419/12 - The Indigenous Peoples of the Lower Omo 
(Represented by Survival International Charitable Trust) v Ethiopia, the Commission issued an Order 
against the State, requesting the latter to adopt Provisional Measures to prevent irreparable harm 
being caused to the victim of alleged human rights violations; the State has not respected that Order’. 
9 E.g. OSJI, From Judgment to Justice: Implementing International and Regional Human Rights 
Decisions, at. 107; Report of the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Displaced 
Persons and Migrants in Africa, presented at the 52 Ordinary Session of the African Commission, 
held between 9- 22 October 2012, para. 44. 
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The African Court has enabled States to use the application for interpretation of a judgment 
procedure as set out in Rule 66 of the Rules of Court to request clarity on what is expected 
from them in the implementation of judgments and orders ruled by the Court. The African 
Court can and does offer technical assistance to States on how to implement its decision. At 
least two States have requested the Court to clarify aspects of its orders in order for them to 
be able to implement the ruling.12 The procedure is in effect a new application, for 
interpretation of a judgment, as set out in Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Here, however, the 
roles are reversed: the State then becoming the applicant, and the previous applicant, the 
Respondent. 
 
Are such processes insufficient or simply not properly used? Why, given the above tools, 
has the African Commission, for example, not produced publicly available information on the 
status of implementation of at least some of its decisions? In part, the processes do not 
appear to have been exploited to their full potential due to limited information from States, 
and insufficient staffing resources, among other factors. In addition, there are also key 
processes/tools behind the scenes which are missing, such as efficient and comprehensive 
case management systems/databases which if in place would help the monitoring overall. 
The task of follow-up and monitoring implementation has been added on to already existing 
processes/work but with limited if any additional resources. 
 
In addition to existing processes, specific mechanisms have also been established to enable 
the bodies themselves to monitor implementation of their decisions and judgments. These, 
as will be seen, encompass many of the types of monitoring that are listed above. Rule 112 
of the African Commission’s Rules of Procedure sets out the procedure for ‘follow-up’ to be 
used by the African Commission. Here its role includes reporting, information-gathering, 
assessment and arguably enforcement and is not only reactive but also proactive. These 
roles have principally been coordinated by the African Commission’s Working Group on 
Communications, composed of Commissioners and members of the secretariat, which is 
tasked with considering communications.13 Its mandate was expanded in October 2012 to 
include the coordination of follow-up of decisions and [collecting] ‘information on the status of 
implementation of the Commission’s decisions’ which it should then present in a report at 
each session.14 
 
Article 29 of the Protocol establishing the African Court gives the task of monitoring to the 
AU’s Executive Council although its ability to do so is dependent on the African Court 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 E.g. a decision on a number of related communications against Mauritania was discussed in a 
promotional visit by the CPTA Chairperson in 2012, Report of the Promotional Mission to the Islamic 
Republic of Mauritania, held between 26 March –1 April 2012, at p.9. Similarly, in a mission to 
Botswana in 2005, the visiting delegation requested information on the steps taken to implement 
recommendations on the decision on Modise vs Botswana communication, Report of the Promotional 
Mission to the Republic of Botswana, held between 14-18 February 2005, at.13. 
11 See Resolution on the Human Rights Situation on Eritrea, adopted at the 38th ordinary session held 
between 21 November to 5 December 2005.  
12 See for instance, Urban Mkandawire v The Republic of Malawi, Application 003/2011, Ruling of the 
African Court 28 March 2014 http://en.african-
court.org/images/Cases/Judgment/Ruling%20Appl.%20003-
2011%20Urban%20Mkandawire%20v%20Malawi%20-%20English.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017). 
Request for interpretation in Application 005/2013 Alex Thomas v Tanzania is still pending before the 
African Court. 
13 Resolution on the mandate of the Working Group on Communications of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ACHPR/Res.212, March 2012. 
14 Resolution on the expansion of the mandate of the working group on communications and 
modifying its composition, ACHPR/Res.255, October 2012. 
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providing it with the information on ‘non-compliance’ in its activity report.15 In a 2014 
Decision, the Executive Council called on the African Court to ‘propose, for consideration by 
the PRC, a concrete reporting mechanism that will enable it to bring to the attention of 
relevant policy organs, situations of non-compliance and/or any other issues within its 
mandate, at any time, when the interests of justice so require’.16 It has been suggested that 
‘reporting’ should be considered as separate from ‘monitoring’ and ‘enforcement’.17 
‘Reporting’ includes those reports on non-compliance submitted by the African Court to the 
Executive Council through Article 31 of the Protocol. ‘Monitoring’ should be undertaken by 
the Executive Council in accordance with Article 29; and include the ability of the Executive 
Council, through working groups or a group specifically for ‘ongoing supervision of the state 
of execution of judicial decisions of the Court’, to issue regulations or directions or 
appropriate action.18 ‘Enforcement’ will then be carried out by the Assembly of the AU, with 
information on the measures taken by the State being maintained by a register at the AU 
Commission.19 
 
The practice of the African Commission and the African Court reveals that they employ a 
range of different tasks to monitor implementation. With respect to information gathering, the 
African Commission has received information from one or both parties to the 
communication,20 and on occasion others,21 on the extent to which its recommendations 
have been implemented. It has also been more active in gathering evidence of 
implementation, for example, by sending Notes Verbales and letters to the States and 
parties requesting information, although the responses are not always provided.22 Despite it 
not being expressly mentioned in Rule 112, it has also held hearings on implementation23 
and held a panel on implementation as part of its plenary sessions.24 
                                                          
15 Article 31, Protocol Establishing the African Court. 
16 Decision EX.CL/Dec.806 (XXIV), at 24th Ordinary Session 21-28 January 2014. 
17 African Court Coalition (n 7 above), para 2.2. See also Grace Wakio Kakai, Head of Legal Division, 
‘Compliance with Supranational Human Rights Judgements and decisions in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Successes, Challenges and Opportunities. African Court On Human And Peoples’ Rights 
Experience’, Presentation, Raoul Wallenberg Institute, Closing The Implementation Gap – 
Strengthening Compliance With Regional Human Rights Decisions Regional Symposium, 27–28 
September 2016, Hotel Intercontinental, Nairobi, Kenya, on file with authors. 
18 African Court Coalition, (n 7 above), para 2.2. See also Wakio Kakai, (n 17 above). 
19 African Court Coalition, (n 7 above), para 2.2. See also Wakio Kakai, (n 17 above). 
20 ‘In Communication 365/08, the Complainant informed the Commission that the decision of the 
Commission has been partially implemented, and the Commission has requested the State to 
implement the outstanding part of the decision. In Communication 323/06, the Respondent State 
indicated that efforts have been made to protect the rights of women in the country in general, and the 
Commission has requested the State for information regarding the concrete measures (being) taken 
to implement the specific decision of the Commission in the Communication in identified areas’, 36th 
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, November 2013- May 
2014, paras 24-27. 
21 IHRDA Communication Nos.54/91-61/91, 98-93-164/97, 196/97, 210/98, Malawi Africa Association 
et al v Mauritania, Implementation Dossier. For presentation to the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the occasion of the 50th ordinary session, October 2011. IHRDA were not the 
original complainants. See also statements made during sessions of the African Commission, e.g. 
IHRDA, Statement of IHRDA on implementation of the African Commission’s decision in 
Communication 292/04, IHRDA v Angola at the 58th Ordinary Session of the Commission, 12 April 
2016 
22 E.g. ‘The Commission did not receive any information on this during the reporting period’, 37th 
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June – December 2014, 
para 50. 
23 E.g. in relation to the Endorois case, Resolution Calling on the Republic of Kenya to Implement the 
Endorois Decision adopted by the African Commission, ACHPR/Res.257, 5 November 2013. 
24 As a panel at its session in November 2015. See also Meeting between African Commission, 
African Court, African Committee on Rights and Welfare of the Child and AU, September 2012, Addis 
Ababa. 
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For example, at the 53rd ordinary session of the African Commission in April 2013, the 
Commission held an implementation hearing in respect of the Endorois case. During the 
hearing, the parties updated the Commission on the implementation of its decision in the 
Endorois case.25 Thereafter, the Commission sent a Note Verbale dated 29 April 2013 to the 
government of Kenya reminding the government of its pledge during the oral hearing to 
submit an interim report within 90 days of the hearing and a comprehensive report at the 
next session (54th ordinary session) of the Commission.26 The oral hearing on 
implementation was followed by a workshop held on 23 September 2013 on the status of 
implementation of the Endorois decision, organised by the African Commission’s Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in collaboration with the Endorois Welfare 
Council.27 Due to the failure of the government of Kenya to participate in the implementation 
workshop and provide feedback as promised during the oral hearing, the Commission 
adopted Resolution 257 on 5 November 2013 urging the government of Kenya to comply 
with its obligations under the African Charter by implementing the Endorois decision. 
 
With respect to reporting as a tool for monitoring implementation, the African Commission’s 
annual report, which includes the annexes of the decisions on communications, has for a 
number of years included a section outlining ‘the situation of the compliance with its 
recommendations by the State Parties’.28 This is consolidated by requests from the 
Executive Council that ‘Parties to Communications to provide the ACHPR with information 
regarding implementation of decisions and recommendations of the ACHPR’.29 The African 
Court publishes in its activity report a list of States and increasingly detailed information on 
implementation.30 The information lists the particular reparation ordered by the Court and 
then provides detail on what the State has done, if anything, to implement that measure. In 
one situation, with respect to Libya, it adopted an Interim Report’ which noted that ‘Libya has 
failed to comply with a judgment of the Court’.31 It submitted this report to the Assembly of 
the AU in accordance with Article 31 of the Protocol and Rule 51(4) of the Rules of Court, 
recommending that ‘the Assembly to express itself on Libya’s non-compliance with the Court 
Order and to call upon Libya to comply forthwith and, also for Libya to report to the Court 
within 14 days on what measures Libya has taken to comply with the Court Order; the 
Assembly to adopt a decision calling upon all Member States of the African Union to comply 
with and implement Judgments and Orders of the Court, in accordance with Article 30 of the 
Protocol; the Assembly to take such other measures as it deems appropriate to ensure that 
Libya fully complies with the Court Order’.32 
                                                          
25 See African Commission Thirty-Fourth Activity Report (2013) 5; Minority Rights Group International 
‘The Endorois decision – Four years on, the Endorois still await action by the Government of Kenya’ 
http://minorityrights.org/2014/09/23/the-endorois-decision-four-years-on-the-endorois-still-await-
action-by-the-government-of-kenya/ (accessed 12 July 2017). 
26 Resolution Calling on the Republic of Kenya to Implement the Endorois Decision, ACHPR/Res.257, 
5 November 2013. 
27 As above. 
28 Resolution ACHPR/Res.97, Resolution on the Importance of the Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights by States Parties, 
November 2006, para 3. 
29 EX.CL/Dec.841(XXV) Decision On The Thirty-Sixth Activity Report Of The African Commission On 
Human And Peoples‟ Rights, para 3. 
30 See e.g. Report on the Activities of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR), to 
the Executive Council 30th Ordinary Session, 22-27 January 2017, EX.CL/999 (XXX), para 21. Mid-
Term Activity Report of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1 January – 30 June 2017, 
section 21(d). 
31 Interim Report on Libya, para 8. 
32 Interim Report on Libya, paras 9-10. Report on the Activities of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR), to the Executive Council 30th Ordinary Session, 22-27 January 2017, 
EX.CL/999 (XXX), para 56. 
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The African Commission can offer its good offices to parties to a communication and 
facilitate dialogue between them in the implementation of its decisions.33 Whether the parties 
make use of this potential as often as they might is a question to be considered further. 
 
In carrying out its role under the Protocol and the Rules of Court, the African Court has 
required, as part of the judgment or Ruling in Reparations, for States to report back to it 
within a period of time on the measures they have taken to implement the judgment.34 The 
African Court, we were informed, also writes to States to request information and regularly 
updates this information. Neither the African Commission nor African Court appear to have 
an electronic case management database which incorporates data on the implementation of 
the decisions and rulings. 
 
Both the African Court and the African Commission have then used any information they 
have collated to make an assessment on the extent to which the State has implemented the 
judgment or decision. For the African Commission this is not done consistently. For example, 
there are only a handful of cases where the African Commission has made more detailed 
analysis and statements on a State’s failure to implement, prompted, it would appear, by 
sustained campaigns from the litigants or interested civil society organisations.35  
 
The African Court has not published any criteria on what amounts to ‘full’ or ‘partial’ 
implementation, although it has used these terms. For example 
‘[w]hile welcoming the efforts made by Burkina Faso and Tanzania to implement the 
Court’s judgments, the Court notes that the two countries are yet to fully comply with 
the orders of the Court in those judgments, and further notes Tanzania’s 
unwillingness to comply with the Court’s Orders for Provisional Measures’.36 
 
This terminology could, however, be read as relating to the number of specific orders in the 
judgment, rather than an assessment of the nature of the measures taken with respect to 
each particular order.  
 
There is no information that is consistently publicly available on how the African Commission 
or African Court assess the accuracy or test the veracity of information given to them on the 
extent to which the State has implemented the decision or judgment. In the end it may come 
down to whether the complainant or applicant accepts and is content with what the State 
claims it has done. 
 
E. Conclusions  
Although findings are still at a preliminary stage, our research asserts the following 
conclusions. It reveals that although the body monitoring implementation, in our context, the 
African Commission or the African Court, is expected to play various roles, there appears to 
be no coherent or strategic approach. The consequences of this are several. Firstly, there 
                                                          
33 Final Communiqué of the Workshop on the Status of Implementation of the Endorois Decision of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 23rd September 2013, para 4. 
34 Application No.011/2011, Ruling on Reparations in Reverend Christopher R Mtikila v United 
Republic of Tanzania, 13 June 2014. 
35 E.g. the Communication 276/03, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority 
Rights Group International (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v. the Republic of Kenya, 
ACHPR/Res.257, Resolution Calling on the Republic of Kenya to Implement the Endorois Decision, 
November 2013. 
36 Report on the Activities of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR), to the 
Executive Council 30th Ordinary Session, 22-27 January 2017, EX.CL/999 (XXX), para 57. 
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are times at which none of these tasks are being carried out because the bodies do not 
consider it their responsibility to do so. Secondly, many of these tasks are being carried out 
but not well or consistently well. Thirdly, there is no coherent picture from those within or 
outside the bodies as to whether these roles are appropriate or not, whether they 
themselves are best placed to play them, play them on some occasions and not others, or 
whether others should be doing these tasks instead. Finally, one of the reasons why the 
African Court and African Commission appear to be carrying out the variety of monitoring 
activities is because they are doing so in lieu of a more holistic and coherent system being 
put in place, particularly at the AU level.  The sub-committee envisaged by Rule 112(8) of 
the African Commission’s Rules of Procedure has not become operational and any real 
monitoring or enforcement from the AU level, beyond simply calling on States to implement 
decisions of the two bodies,37  is therefore limited and in many respects absent. 
 
The inter-relationship between the African Court and African Commission is also dependant 
on clarifying what their respective roles should be. The African Court has a specific role 
under Rule 118(1) and (2) of the African Commission’s Rules of Procedure arguably to 
‘enforce’ decisions of the African Commission where the State has failed to implement. 
Given the lack of clarity on the African Commission’s role with respect to monitoring its own 
decisions, so the execution of Rule 118 and which cases it should refer to the African Court 
is problematic, particularly if the African Court considers that cases which come before it 
should be examined de novo. If the African Court ‘enforces’ the African Commission decision 
by in effect giving it binding status it potentially, paradoxically, undermines not only the 
African Commission’s own view that its decisions are binding,38 but also the legitimacy of the 
African Commission and could, arguably imply that States are not obliged to react to the 
African Commission’s decision until there is a confirmation of such by the Court. This is 
                                                          
37 E.g. ‘call[ed] on states to implement the decisions and recommendations’ of the African 
Commission as well as to ‘respond to the ACHPR’s Urgent Appeals and comply with Orders for 
Provisional Measures issued by the ACHPR’, EX.CL/Dec.841(XXV) Decision On The Thirty-Sixth 
Activity Report Of The African Commission On Human And Peoples‟ Rights, para 3. EX.CL/Dec.804 
(XXIV), Decision On The Thirty- Fifth Activity Report of The African Commission on Human And 
Peoples’ Rights: ‘Calls upon Member States to implement decisions and recommendations of the 
ACHPR, respond to Urgent Appeals from the ACHPR, and to comply with Provisional Measures 
issued by the ACHPR’; EX.CL/Dec.775(XXIII), Decision On The Thirty - Fourth Activity Report Of The 
African Commission On Human And Peoples’ Rights: ‘Exhorts State Parties to take concerted action 
to address the human rights issues that the ACHPR has identified as being continuing concerns on 
the continent and to comply with the decisions and recommendations of the ACHPR’, para 4. See 
also EX.CL/Dec. 372 (XI), Decision On The 22nd Activity Report Of The African Commission On 
Human And Peoples’ Rights, para xi. ‘[U]rge[d] Member States to commit unconditionally to, and 
comply with judgements rendered by the Court’, EX.CL/Dec.865(XXVI), Decision On The 2014 
Activity Report of The African Court On Human And Peoples’ Rights, para 3. ‘Welcomes the response 
of Libya to the Court’s Order of Provisional Measures in relation to a matter filed against the State 
Party before the Court, but NOTES that the response does not indicate the measures Libya has taken 
to implement the said Order, with regard to allowing “...the accused access to a lawyer of his 
choosing, family visits and to refrain from taking any action that may affect the Detainee’s physical 
and mental integrity as well as his health...”’, EX.CL/Dec.842(XXV), Decision On The Mid-Term 
Activity Report Of The African Court On Human And Peoples‟ Rights, para 3. 
38 Communication 147/95-149/96 Sir Dawda K. Jawara v Gambia, 11 May 2000; Communication 
211/98 Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia, 7 May 2001, paras 61-62. Account of Internal 
Legislation of Nigeria and the Dispositions of the Charter of African Human and Peoples’ Rights at 6; 
International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisations and Interights on behalf 
of Ken Saro-Wira v Nigeria, paras. 113 and 116. See also Murray, The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law, at 54-55; Viljoen, International Human Rights Law 
in Africa, at 339. Communication 87/93, Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lakwot 
and six others) v Nigeria, 22 March 1995. Resolution ACHPR/Res.97, Resolution on the Importance 
of the Implementation of the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights by States Parties, November 2006. 
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clearly not a desirable solution. Ironically, in the majority of situations that we have been 
examining the State has not questioned the legal status of the African Commission’s 
decision at all.39  
 
Rather our research has found that the reasons why the decision or judgment will be 
implemented are more complex. They include the current political context such as whether 
there has been a change in government; the particularly sensitivity of the issues in the 
decision/judgment versus what is happening in the State at the time; what kind of remedies 
the decision/judgment requires; and the practical feasibility of carrying them out. Sometimes 
States may well have implemented, at least in part, a decision or judgment but this is not 
information that is known publicly. Other factors include consideration of the specificity of the 
recommendations or orders made by the African Commission and Court and whether a 
correct balance was made between providing clarity to the State on what precisely was 
required of it to implement the decision, as against giving it the discretion to determine what 
was the most appropriate way of implementing within the context of the State.40 
 
We recognise that detailed consideration of all of these issues relies on some structural 
reform at not only the levels of the bodies themselves but also at the AU. Equally, clarity on 
respective roles impacts on basic procedural issues. For example, research elsewhere, and 
our preliminary findings support this, indicates that the visibility of the decision and judgment 
as well as what the State may or may not have done to implement it, is crucial to successful 
implementation. Yet, it is not always clear whose responsibility it is to publicise the decision, 
inform others beyond the parties, and make national, regional and international actors aware 
of what the State has done to implement. As noted above, the African Court is providing 
detail in its activity reports on the measures taken by the States to implement its judgments. 
The African Commission, in contrast, has been more hesitant in taking an active role in 
disseminating, beyond the parties to the case, information on the decision or judgment and 
the level of its implementation. Relatedly, decisions are now not attached to the African 
Commission’s activity reports, as they had been in the past. The African Commission may 
also delay the process of finalising the final text of the decision, thus introducing further 
uncertainty and lack of clarity about when the State and parties have been ‘informed’ of the 
Commission’s decision. 
 
There is clear acknowledgment by those within and outside the African Court and African 
Commission that monitoring implementation is not working as well as it could be. The African 
Court noted in its 2017 mid-term report listed among its challenges the non-implementation 
of its decisions, including refusals to implement, failure to inform the Court of what measures 
have been taken, and the slow-pace’ or ‘reluctance’ to comply.41 Similarly, the African 
Commission has recently ‘lamented the low compliance rate’ of States with its decisions.42 
Yet, there is also an impasse, certainly at the level of the African Commission, in terms of 
what steps should now be taken to put in place a coherent and effective system. Whilst 
                                                          
39 There is one notable historical exception, Communication 313/05, Kenneth Good v Botswana, 26 
May 2010: ‘the Government has made its position clear; that it is not bound by the decision of the 
Commission’, Combined 32nd and 33rd Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, February – October 2012, EX.CL/782(XXII) Rev.2, para 24. 
40 See also S Cardenas, Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights 
Pressure (2007); C Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The 
Problem of Compliance (2014); B Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in 
Domestic Politics (2009); Open Society Justice Initiative, (n 1 above); Open Society Justice Initiative, 
(n 1 above). 
41 See Mid-Term Activity Report of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1 January – 30 
June 2017, paras 45-46. 
42 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 42nd Activity Report Of The African 
Commission On Human And Peoples’ Rights Submitted in Accordance with Article 54 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2017, para 35(a). 
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admirable that time is being taken to consider these issues, this is also frustrating. Even if a 
cohesive approach can be found, it will not be quick. In the meantime, victims are still 
awaiting justice on the remedies already recommended and ordered. We therefore consider 
that there are various practical and immediate steps that can be taken to enhance the 
monitoring process. 
 
Leaving aside proper consideration of what roles these bodies should undertake, our 
research has found that at the very least the African Commission and the African Court 
should gather information about implementation. Both the Commission and Court have the 
competence to do so within their existing Rules of Procedure. A reactive role requires no 
immediate additional resources and indeed, the bodies appear already to be carrying this 
out, albeit not consistently or comprehensively. However, a proactive information-gathering 
role requires a little more thought and necessitates actively seeking out information, on a 
regular basis, from the parties but also other actors at the national, regional and international 
levels. 
 
Secondly, an internal case management system which includes information on the measures 
taken by the State to implement the decision or judgment could assist the African 
Commission and African Court in keeping track on the sources of evidence, the timeframe in 
which any measures may have been taken, and enable this data to be cross-referenced with 
other records that they may hold on that State. 
 
Finally, one of the challenges, certainly for the African Commission which has many more 
decisions than the Court, appears to have been the difficulty in prioritising which 
communications it should focus its efforts in monitoring implementation. It is suggested that 
the African Commission could use a ‘pilot’ approach, starting with a handful of 
communications around which it could develop a strategy and which it could use to consider 
what role or roles it is best placed to play. In due course, the African Commission may also 
consider the need to establish a dedicated rapporteur or working group specifically on 
monitoring implementation of its decisions. This may be preferable to having the Working 
Group on Communications also oversee implementation. 
 
These suggestions are very modest, and are certainly not sufficient, but could be part of 
broader and more ambitious moves to take monitoring of implementation forward. 
 
 
